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Despite raising an amount of taxes that represents nearly 37% of the country’s GDP and 
spending over half of this revenue on social programmes, the Brazilian government has not 
been able to significantly alleviate inequality and poverty. In fact, Brazil is among the 10 most 
unequal countries in the world and about 33% of its population still lives in poverty (some 
15% in extreme poverty).
1 Brazil is an exception to the observed international pattern, where 
high income inequality is generally associated with low levels of tax revenue as a proportion 
of GDP. In Figure 1
2, we notice that the United Kingdom and Spain, for example, with a 
similar tax burden to that of Brazil, have much lower income inequality as indicated by the 
Gini coefficient. On the other hand, Mexico and Chile, with Gini coefficients close to that for 
Brazil, have a much lower tax burden. 
 
A number of studies have provided evidence that, to a great extent, this situation is due to the 
inadequate targeting of public expenditures
3. The distributive impact of the financing of these 
expenditures, however, has received less attention. In particular, there are few studies that 
estimate the net redistributive effect of the tax and benefit policies.
4 This issue is particularly 
important for a country such as Brazil where tax revenues are raised mainly from taxes which 
fall indiscriminately on all households. 
 
This paper, thus, investigates the redistributive impact of taxes and government cash transfers 
among households in Brazil. In order to highlight the need of reforming the Brazilian tax-
benefit system, we also compare its redistributive performance with that of some countries 
with a similar tax burden as a percentage of GDP. The paper is structured in four sections. 
After this introduction, section 2 discusses the method used in this paper, microsimulation 
modelling. Section 3 briefly describes the taxes and cash transfers considered in this study 
and the main procedures and data used in our calculations. Section 4 presents and discusses 
the results. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. METHOD: MICROSIMULATION 
 
In order to evaluate the redistributional impact of the Brazilian tax-benefit system, one needs 
information about how taxes and benefits operate at the individual level. Because the 
necessary information is often not available in survey data, it is necessary to simulate these 
variables. For this we use a tax-benefit microsimulation model. In this section we consider the 





                                                 
1 See Barros et al., 2000. 
2 All figures and tables in this paper are displayed at the end of the text. 
3 See, among others, Amsberg et al, 2000; Barros and Foguel, 2002; Hoffmann, 2001, Ramos, 2000. 
4 To the best of our knowledge, the only studies in Brazil that analyse the distributive impact of public policies 
simultaneously taking account of both sides of the budget – taxes and spending – are Siqueira, Nogueira e Levy 
(2002a, 2002b). 
5 In this paper we draw upon model development lessons learned by a number of the authors as part of the 
EUROMOD project and described in Immervoll and O’Donoghue (2001). Microsimulation Modelling 
 
Due to the great diversity observed among the population and the complexity of the Brazilian 
tax-benefit system, the redistributive analysis of the impact of social and fiscal policies 
requires that a high level of disaggregation be used in order to capture in fine detail their 
effects on the various types of individuals, families and households. Ultimately, it is the social 
and economic diversity typically found in the national populations that determines how 
economic agents will be affected by the tax and benefit rules. On the other hand, as different 
social programs interact with each other and with the tax system, it is crucial to take explicitly 
into account the interdependencies within the whole tax-benefit system. 
 
Typically hypothetical families have been used to examine the operation of taxes and benefits 
and the impact of reforms. Although a useful method for illustration purposes and for 
comparison across countries, the approach is not very satisfactory for looking at tax-benefit 
policy in a country as usually families which are considered “typical” form in fact only a very 
small proportion of the population. It is desirable therefore to look at the population as a 
whole using representative micro-datasets.  
 
An approach that follows this method is microsimulation modelling. Recent advances in 
information technology and the availability of large-scale datasets have allowed and 
stimulated the development of these models. Microsimulation models are computer programs 
that calculate tax liabilities and benefit entitlements for individuals, families or households in 
a nationally representative micro-data sample of the population. The model calculates each 
element of the tax-benefit system in the legal order so that interactions between different 
elements of the system are fully taken into account. Calculations for each individual, family 
or household are weighted to provide results at the population level.  
 
By incorporating the interactions of different elements of the tax-benefit system and by taking 
full account of the diversity of characteristics in the population, this approach allows a very 
detailed analysis of the revenue, distributional and incentive effects of the individual policy 
instruments and the system as a whole. In particular, they give a great deal of flexibility to 
analysts. For example: 
•  They simulate policy instruments that may not already exist in the micro-datasets on 
which they are based. As micro-data is not necessarily collected every year and may take 
time for the data to be available to researchers, microsimulation models can be used to 
simulate more up to date policy rules. Therefore they have the capability of looking at the 
incidence of existing policy on an existing population and can examine the efficiency of 
anti-poverty measures in actually reducing poverty. 
•  As a simulation mechanism, they are also well placed to look at the incentive impact of 
existing policy. Although the model framework described here is a static framework, it is 
possible to measure the pressures on behaviour such as marginal tax rates and replacement 
rates
6. 
•  The primary advantage of microsimulation models however is that they can simulate 
policy reform. They can thus be used to compute the first round revenue effects of 
reforms. Moreover, containing both social protection programs and taxation instruments, 
models of this kind can look not only at changes to social policy programs but also 
examine different methods of financing.  
                                                 
6 See for example, O’Donoghue and Utili, (2001), who study both the distributional and incentive effects of the 
impact of reforms targeting low wage workers in Europe.  
  2.•  The first round distribution of resulting winners and losers particularly with reference to 
particular target populations can also be found. Moreover, capturing the heterogeneity of 
government law, they can examine the interaction of different instruments. 
•  Incorporating micro-data, they can also be used to look at the distributional impact of 
policy reform. Thus it is possible to see how reforms are incident on households of 
different incomes and examine horizontal redistribution by focusing, for example, on 
families with children, the elderly or the sick. Exploiting the hierarchical nature of 
households, they can also focus in gender dimensions by looking at within household 
sharing and the impact of government policy. 
•  The user-friendly nature of such models makes them suitable for a variety of uses and 
users, both governmental and non-governmental, informing the debate of social and 
economic policy, and making policy decisions more transparent in terms of their impacts 
on the population. 
 
The use of microsimulation models therefore, can greatly contribute to improved design and 
efficacy of policies (Atkinson et al., 2002), providing a powerful tool to policy designers and 
analysts, allowing the simulation of changes in the existing tax-benefit system, performing 
“what if” experiments and examining their distributional and revenue implications (Redmond, 
Sutherland and Wilson, 1998). The development of microsimulation models involves the 
construction of a software environment to handle the data, policy simulation and output 
routines, the transformation and matching of existing micro-datasets into definitions and 
structures required to simulate tax-benefit laws and the translation of the law itself into a 
computational framework.  
 
Microsimulation Modelling in Developing Countries 
 
One of the issues this paper must consider is the fact that circumstances, systems and data 
may not necessarily be the same in developed economies where the technique has been 
utilised and in emerging economies. Atkinson and Bourguignon (1990) carried out a study of 
the lessons of tax-benefit modelling in OECD countries for emerging economies. They found 
that, although often more difficult to implement, simulating tax-benefit systems for these 
countries should "lead to a comprehensive, powerful and yet simple instrument for the design 
of an efficient redistribution system adapted to the specificity of developing countries". 
Focusing on Brazil as a case study, they found that much of the redistribution in the existing 
Brazilian system in the 1980's relied on instruments that were less important in OECD 
countries. For example, indirect taxes, subsidies and the provision of targeted non-cash 
benefits such as public education and subsidised school meals were found to be more 
important. Instruments more important in OECD systems and often the main instruments in 
tax-benefit models (personal income taxes, social insurance contributions and pensions), were 
largely confined to the modern sector in Brazil and thus of less importance to policy makers. 
Nevertheless they argued that sufficient data existed at the time to simulate many of the 
Brazilian specific instruments in addition to the “classic” ones. They stressed however that 
merging of data from different datasets may be necessary for this purpose. As a consequence 
of recent advances in the analysis of related data-sets (see Deaton, 1998) as well as 
improvements in the availability of data for less developed countries, the use of tax-benefit 
modelling techniques needs no longer be limited to countries where such models have been in 
use for some time.  
 
Atkinson and Bourguignon’s paper set the scene for the construction of tax-benefit models for 
less developed countries. The objective of our study is to go beyond this and actually focus 
  3.more on the practical issues of constructing a tax-benefit model by reference to the precise 
rules of the tax-benefit systems and the detail of the available micro-data.  
 
The Design of a Microsimulation Model 
 
A microsimulation framework adopts a hierarchical view of a country’s tax-benefit system. In 
modelling a country’s system, it is desirable to match the “real” system’s hierarchy as closely 
as possible so that the logical representation provides a good intuitive equivalent of the 
original. Figure 2 below gives an example of this hierarchical structure. Each tax-benefit 
system is made up of individual policies. These are elementary collections of tax-benefit 
instruments such as Income Tax, Social Insurance Contributions or Social Assistance 
Benefits. The policy spine is a list of policies indicating the sequence by which they are 
applied in the tax- benefit system. For example, if social insurance contributions are tax 
deductible, then the entry Social Insurance Contributions would have to appear before Income 
Tax. On the other hand, if social assistance benefits depend on after-tax income, then the 
entry Social Assistance Benefits would have to appear after Income Tax since income tax is a 
necessary input for calculating social assistance benefits.
7 At the lowest level is the tax-benefit 
module, which performs the calculation of a certain part of the tax or benefit (e.g., a 
deduction, or applying a rate schedule to a tax base) on each fiscal unit.  
 
A modular structure allows one, as the model develops, to create a library of modules. These 
can be used as “building-blocks” so that when it is necessary to incorporate a new tax or 
benefit instrument, it will often not be necessary to program any new tax-benefit rules. 
Instead, it may be possible for existing modules to be used. They can be re-arranged in any 
order necessary. A high level of parameterisation ensures that the same modules can be used 
for a multitude of different purposes. Concepts that a user may want to change in the model 
and thus should be parameterised for ease of use include: 
•  Updating of dataset to year of simulation. As the year of the dataset may not necessarily 
be the same as the year of simulation (the year policy rules are taken from), it will be 
necessary to update the dataset to account for differences in the intervening period. For 
this purpose external information will be needed. Updating which may be required 
includes allowance for inflation/income growth by variable or allowance for changing 
population structure by altering the weights. 
•  The definition of the fiscal unit (e.g., individual, household, married couple, families with 
children - including the definition of a “child”) which is relevant for the module and of the 
income concepts (e.g., the definition of taxable income, “means” for a means-tested 
benefit, etc.). In order to simulate the effect of widening the tax base or of incorporating 
new policies in a particular income concept such as disposable income, users may want to 
alter with ease the definition of these concepts. 
•  All relevant amounts (such as thresholds, limits, allowances, rates, number of tax bands, 
etc.) necessary for applying the relevant tax or benefit rules should be parameterised to 
enable non-structural policy reforms to be simulated with ease. 
•  Behavioural Response 
 
As a static modelling framework, the model only measures the day after effect. However it is 
clear that reforms may have a behavioural response. For example the introduction of the Bolsa 
                                                 
7 In a few cases, it might be desirable to deviate from a purely linear sequence of policies. If there are optional 
policies, which the tax payer/benefit recipient can choose from, it would be necessary to simulate all the 
individual options (e.g., individual or joint taxation) and then apply some rule for choosing between them (e.g., 
by assuming a decision which would maximise disposable income). 
  4.Escola program in a number of Brazilian cities, which gives cash benefits to poor families 
whose children continue on in school, saw school dropout rates decrease and school 
attendance increase (Schiefelbein, 1997). Incorporating dynamic processes like this would be 
beyond the scope of an initial stage of construction of a microsimulation model. It would 
require extra algorithms to be coded in the framework and in addition, a priori, the micro-
behavioural information required would not have been available for a reform of this kind. 
However, as an alternative, sensitivity analyses could be carried out. It would be possible for 
analysts to vary the proportion of those eligible for the new instrument. Routines of this kind 
are analogous to the implementation of marginal tax-rate calculators. On this point some 
effort may also be necessary to specify appropriate definitions of marginal tax calculations in 




Once the tax-benefit system has been coded the data are passed through the model. At this 
stage, one discovers whether all the variables required by the model algorithms have in fact 
been included in the dataset and whether they are in the correct format. Once this works, one 
must determine whether all the interactions between the simulated components operate 
correctly. The validation process is therefore one of the largest components in building a 
microsimulation model. 
 
Typically the first stage in this process is to compare the output of the model for sets of 
hypothetical households against manually calculated taxes and benefits. Although the rules 
may in fact be correctly coded, simulated aggregates may not necessarily match official 
aggregates. The next stage of the validation process is therefore to compare the aggregate 
outputs against those in official statistics. Useful external sources of data for validation 
include official figures, other studies, other survey data, existing models, etc.  
 
3. BUILDING THE PROTOTYPE 
 
In this study we implement a prototype tax-benefit microsimulation model for Brazil, the 
Brazilian Household Microsimulation System (BRAHMS). The model simulates household 
sector taxes and cash transfers based on the 1999 household survey Pesquisa Nacional por 
Amostra de Domicílios – PNAD
8, Brazil’s main nationally representative microdata source of 
demographic and socio-economic household characteristics. However, PNAD does not 
contain expenditure data. Information for household expenditure comes from the Pesquisa de 
Orçamentos Familiares (POF) 1995/96, Brazil's major expenditure survey. 
 
The main direct and indirect taxes are simulated in the model. The taxes that are simulated by 
the model include the following income-based revenue raising instruments: The personal 
income tax and the employee and the employer social security contributions. In the case of the 
personal income tax and the social insurance contributions, for which there is no direct 
information in the PNAD, the values are simulated applying the legislation of the tax system 
to each individual or family in the PNAD microdata set. The estimates are then compared to 
available administrative data and adjusted to better reflect the effective incidence on taxes and 
benefits. The simulated amounts, validated against administrative data were found on average, 
to be about 90% of the administrative data. 
 
                                                 
8 The authors are already working in the updating of the model’s micro-dataset to the PNAD2001. 
  5.In addition the following indirect taxes are also simulated: Taxes on the circulation of goods 
and services (ICMS), taxes on industrialised products (IPI), the contribution to the financing 
of the social security (COFINS) and contributions to the social integration programs 
(PIS/PASEP). Because there are no expenditure data in the PNAD and because of the time 
limitations in the present study preventing us from doing a statistical match between the 
datasets, an imputation mechanism has been used to simulate indirect taxes. 
 
The amount of indirect taxes paid by households was calculated as follows: 
•  The effective tax rates on final goods and services were estimated using input-output 
techniques
9; 
•  The estimated tax rates were applied to the 1995/96 household expenditure survey POF to 
calculate the amount of indirect taxes paid by POF households as a proportion of their 
incomes; 
•  These proportions were then used to estimate the payment of indirect taxes by the PNAD 
households groups defined in this paper. It was assumed that their incidence was fully 
shifted to the final consumer. 
 
It should be noted that, since POF covers only metropolitan areas, this procedure assumes that 
the tax burden on a household elsewhere in the country is the same as that on a metropolitan 
household with the same income. In addition, it is assumed that the definitions of income in 
POF and PNAD are compatible.  
 
BRAHMS simulates the following cash transfer programs: Pensions (regarding both the civil 
servants and private employees regimes), the old age assistance benefit, the unemployment 
benefit, the wage bonus, the family benefit (salário-família) and the Bolsa-Escola programs.
10 
For the Bolsa-Escola programs, we have opted in the present paper to simulate the coverage 
defined in the 2002 Federal Government budget rather than the 1999 situation. This is because 
expenditure on these programs has increased drastically since 1999 – yet it still represents 
only about 2% of the total benefits allocated. Thus, the benefits of these programs were 





In this section we present results about the incidence of different types of government 
transfers and taxes on households using the BRAHMS prototype model. To do this, we use a 
set of income concepts. The starting point is initial income, which is the total annual income 
of all members of the household before the deduction of taxes or the addition of any state 
benefits. Cash benefits are added to initial income to obtain gross income. Personal income 
tax and employers and employees contributions to social security are deducted from gross 
income to give disposable income. Indirect taxes are then deducted to give final income. 
 
                                                 
9 Details on the methodology are presented in Siqueira, Nogueira and Souza (2001). 
10 The Bolsa Escola programs are cash transfer schemes targeted at families with children, conditioned to school 
attendance for school-aged children. The term actually refers to three different programs, the Bolsa Escola, the 
Bolsa Alimentação, and the Bolsa Criança Cidadã, which were grouped together for purpose of presentation in 
this paper. 
11 A set of social expenditure items that so far have not been included but which are often relatively more 
important in developing countries is non-cash social spending, such as health and education benefits. This is 
especially important for households outside the modern sector as they are often excluded from coverage of social 
security benefits. This is another future development of this model.  
  6.To an extent, the relatively low Gini coefficients of developed countries found in Figure 1 
reflect the impact of their tax and benefit systems.
12 By contrast, Brazil has not been able to 
use tax and transfers policies effectively to reduce income inequality. This is illustrated in 
Table 1, which summarises the estimated impacts of cash transfers and direct taxes on the 
distribution of income in Brazil. It shows that the richest 10% of households (according to per 
capita gross income) receive 45.9% of all initial income. This compares with only 0.7% for 
households in the bottom decile group.  
 
The distribution of gross income, which includes government cash transfers, shows a very 
similar pattern as the distribution of initial income. In particular, the top decile’s share 
remains virtually the same (45.7%), while the share appropriated by the first decile remains 
below 1.0%. Thus, there is only a small reduction in ratio of the income share of the top 20% 
to the share of the bottom 20%, from 27 to 25. 
 
The third column of Table 1 shows that the personal income tax and the employer and 
employee social security contributions, altogether, reduce the share of the richest 10% to 
44.8% and increase the share of the poorest 10% to 1.0%. This effect reflects the fact that 
almost all personal income taxed (97%) and about 38% of social security contributions are 
collected from the top income decile, while the average burden of direct taxes on the first 
decile is insignificant. The final column of table 1 incorporates the impact of indirect taxes. 
As we shall see below indirect taxes are regressive and so the gap between rich and poor 
widens as the top decile now receives 46.6% of all final income and the top quintile receiving 
22.8 times the final income of the bottom quintile compared with 21.4 times for disposable 
income. 
 
Progressivity of Instruments 
 
In this section, we consider the redistributive effect and the progressivity of the individual 
instruments of the tax-benefit system. We use measures based on the Lorenz Curve to 
examine the degree of redistribution and progressivity.
13 The Lorenz Curve for pre-tax market 
income is simply a graph of the cumulative population share versus the cumulative income for 
the population ranked by order of their income. The Gini coefficient is a standard index of 
inequality, defined in equation (1):  
         ( 1 )   dp p L G M M ∫ − =
1
0 ) ( 2 1
where p is the cumulative population share and  the Lorenz Curve at point p.   ) (p LM
 
The index used here to measure redistribution is the Reynolds-Smolensky index, which is 
defined as the difference between the Gini coefficients for “base” income (initial income) and 
post-instrument income. The Reynolds-Smolensky index of redistribution can be decomposed 
into the redistributive effect before reranking (the difference between the Lorenz curve for 
market income and the concentration curve for post instrument income) and the reranking 
effect of the instrument (the difference between the concentration curve and the Lorenz 
curve).  
 
Progressivity is a measure of the difference between the level of redistribution of an 
instrument relative to an instrument with the same revenue effect but where the effect is 
                                                 
12 See, for instance, Beer et al. (2001). 
13 The methods described here are standard methods for examining the degree of redistribution and progressivity 
in tax-benefit system (See, for example, Palme 1996). 
  7.proportional to income. It is therefore a measure of the incidence of an instrument. If an 
instrument is disproportionally focused on the lower (upper) half of the distribution, then it is 
regressive (progressive). If an instrument is regressive (progressive), the concentration curve 
for the instrument will fall outside (inside) the Lorenz curve of market income. If the 
instrument is proportional to income, the concentration curve will be exactly the same as the 
Lorenz curve for market income.  
 
In terms of income taxes, progressivity relates to the ability-to-pay principle, whereby those 
with higher incomes are more able to pay higher taxes. A progressive income tax is therefore 
redistributive and thus inequality reducing. On the other-hand, benefits are redistributive if 
they are regressive, so that those with lower incomes receive higher benefits. In this paper we 
use the Kakwani index of progressivity, which is the difference between the Lorenz curve for 
income and the concentration curve for the instrument in question.  
 
If a policy instrument is based on characteristics other than income then income units may 
have a different order of incomes before and after the operation of the instrument. For 
example, pension is targeted at households with elderly people and so households with elderly 
people will receive subsidies while other households will not. This type of redistribution is 
known as horizontal redistribution. Changes in the order of income units in a distribution will 
result in the Lorenz curve of post instrument income being different to its concentration curve. 
The Atkinson-Plotnick reranking index, which is the difference between the Lorenz and 
concentration curves, is the measure of horizontal equity we use. The redistributive effect of a 
policy instrument depends upon the size of the instrument and the progressivity or degree of 
targeting. For example, a well-targeted low value instrument may have a lower degree of 
redistribution than a poorly targeted high value instrument.  
 
The distribution of taxes, as a proportion of the household gross income, is shown is Figure 
3a. Although the income tax is usually at the centre of the tax policy debate in Brazil, one can 
observe that it is indirect taxes and payroll taxes that accounts for most of the tax burden 
borne by households. Personal income taxes only account for 3.7% of initial income 
compared with total taxation of 31.1%. Personal income tax is important only to the 
households in the top decile group, representing, in average, 6% of their gross income. 
 
In Table 2 we decompose the amount of the redistribution due to each of the instruments. We 
consider first how targeted expenditure is utilising the Kakwani progressivity index. A 
positive sign on this index indicates that the instrument is targeted proportionally more on 
those in the top of the initial income distribution than the bottom, while a negative sign 
indicates proportionally more of the instrument targeted at the poorest deciles. A progressive 
tax will therefore have a positive sign, while a benefit targeted on the poor will have a 
negative sign. 
 
Reflecting progressivity patterns found throughout the world, personal income taxes are the 
most progressive of the taxes with a Kakwani index of 0.251. The social security 
contributions shown in Figure 3a include those paid by employees and employers, assuming 
that the latter shift the tax on to the former through lower wages. Overall, the burden of social 
security contribution borne by households is higher than the income tax burden, even for the 
top decile group. Social insurance contributions, because they are levied on employee 
incomes, which are proportionally higher in the income distribution, are progressive, but 
because of their flat rate structure are much less progressive (0.023 for employee and 0.044 
for employer contributions) than the increasing marginal tax rate bands of the personal 
  8.income tax system. We notice that social contributions as a percentage of initial income 
increases up to the seventh decile group, falling in the top decile. This reflects the existence of 
a ceiling in the contribution of private employees. One should also note that the low level of 
social security contribution in the first deciles reflects the fact that there is a sizeable 
proportion of informal workers in these income groups. 
 
Indirect taxes are levied on consumption and because poorer households tend to have lower 
savings rates than richer households, they consume a higher proportion of their income and so 
pay proportionally more indirect taxes. As a result indirect taxes have a regressive effect. 
However, the income saved today by the rich will be spent in a future date, when it will then 
be taxed. Thus, to measure the incidence of indirect taxes in terms of current income tend to 
overestimate the regressivity of these taxes.
14 Independently of how the indirect tax burden 
varies among the decile groups, it is important to stress that the burden borne by the low-
income groups is quite high, representing about one quarter of the consumption spending of 
households in the bottom decile group (Figure 4a). ICMS, the taxation on the circulation of 
goods and services, is the most important of the indirect taxes in revenue terms. On the other 
hand, although PIS/PASEP is quite small, it is the most regressive of the taxes. 
 
Combining the size of the instruments (column B) with the knowledge we have about their 
progressivity (column C), we can determine how redistributive each instrument is. Personal 
income taxation although of relatively low importance, has the highest redistributive effect, 
driven primarily by the strength of the progressivity effect. However because indirect taxes 
are regressive and because they are of greater importance than direct taxes, the total 
redistributive effect of taxes is marginally negative. In Table 1 where we report the Gini for 
gross and final incomes, we see that the net impact of taxation is marginally positive in 
reducing inequality. The difference results from a different base for comparison (initial 
income versus gross income). However, the direction of redistribution in either case is very 
small and so we can therefore conclude that taxation is approximately neutral. 
 
Figure 3b shows the distribution of government cash transfers among the different household 
decile groups. Pensions are the most important category of transfer at 21% of initial income, 
with all other benefit types being less than 1% of initial income  (see table 2). Each of the 
transfer types is proportionally more targeted at the poorest deciles. However we must note 
that the ranking measure used by these statistics is initial income, in other words income 
before transfers and taxes. The inclusion of the transfer in household income may move a 
poor household measured on this income up the income distribution. We see this effect in the 
Atkinson-Plotnick reranking index, where pensions induce the largest reranking of 
households of any instrument. When we rank by final income, as the case in Figure 3b, we 
notice that the targeting of pensions is reduced or even eliminated by this reranking, with 
pensions distributed fairly evenly across decile groups with a peak in the centre of the 
distribution. 
 
Unemployment benefits are the next biggest transfer group with progressivity similar to that 
of pensions. Reranking is hardly present. The wage bonus and the family benefit are the least 
targeted transfers, while old age and Bolsa Escola instruments are very targeted, with 
Kakwani indices of respectively -1.394 and -1.189.  
 
                                                 
14 From a life-cycle point of view, consumption is considered to be a better basis for the analysis of the 
distributive effect of indirect taxes than income. Siqueira, Nogueira and Souza (2000) provides estimates of the 
incidence of indirect taxes for Brazil based on consumption.  
  9.Turning to the redistributive impact of the instruments, we see that on the whole redistribution 





How does the redistribution observed in Brazil compare with redistribution in other countries? 




Figure 4 describes the Gini coefficient for different income concepts for the six countries 
considered. The size of the levelling of income distribution through the benefit and tax system 
can be measured by means of the Gini coefficient. The difference between the Gini 
coefficients of the different income concepts is indicative of the degree of redistribution 
inherent in the difference between incomes. We notice that the reduction in the Gini 
coefficient due to benefits (moving from initial to gross income) and due to direct 
taxes/contributions (moving from gross to disposable income) is much smaller in Brazil than 
in the other countries. While direct taxes have a relatively small redistributive effect in the 
industrialised countries, reducing the Gini coefficient by 5-6%, in Brazil the effect is even 
smaller at less than 2%. The biggest difference however is in the lack of redistributive power 
in the benefit system. While it is the most important set of redistributive instruments in Brazil, 
reducing the Gini coefficient by 6%, it has a much smaller effect than instruments in the 
industrialised countries where, with the exception of the USA and Australia, there are 
reductions of 14-20%. Even the industrialised countries with lowest redistribution, Australia 
and the United States, have double the reduction of Brazil. Therefore it is the lack of 
redistributive power in the transfer system that primarily drives the lower redistribution in 
Brazil compared with other countries.
16  
 
Poverty Efficiency of Benefits 
 
Although the reduction of income inequality is one of the objectives of taxation and transfer 
systems, a more focused objective is the reduction of poverty. Here we consider how effective 
Brazilian transfer instruments are at reducing poverty. In table 3, we describe a number of 
measures (see Weisbrod (1970) and Beckerman (1979)) of the poverty efficiency of transfers 
in Brazil compared with means-tested instruments in Southern European countries, as 
reported in O’Donoghue et al. (2003), for each of the schemes mentioned before. Figure 5, 
due to Beckerman, describes the impact of transfers on disposable income. The measures we 
use to examine the target efficiency of social assistance are based on this diagram: 
•  The first measure is Vertical Expenditure Efficiency (VEE), meaning the share of total 
expenditure going to households who are poor before the transfer and is equal to (A + 
B)/(A + B +C) from Figure 5. 
                                                 
15 See Baldini et al (forthcoming) and Beer et al (2001) 
16 A recent study (Hoffmann, 2003), that decomposes the household income in its various components, 
concludes that income derived from pensions is more concentrated amongst the relatively rich households than 
the income obtained from all sources together. In fact, while the overall Gini index is 0.59, the concentration 
ratio of pensions is 0.60. Thus, income from pensions has actually contributed to increase inequality in Brazil. 
This is especially true of the pension system for public-sector workers, which pays pensions that can be more 
than ten times the ceiling for private-sector pensioners and allows workers to retire unreasonably early, often in 
their 50s. 
  10.•  The next indicator of Poverty Reduction Efficiency (PRE) is the fraction of total 
expenditure allowing poor households to reach the poverty line without overcoming it and 
is defined as (A)/(A + B +C). 
•  The Spillover index (S) is a measure of the excess of expenditure with respect to the 
amount strictly necessary to reach the poverty line, (B)/(A + B). Combining we can see 
that the VEE (1 - S) = PRE. 
 
In fact, these three measures are not sufficient to evaluate how good a transfer system is in 
fighting poverty. A transfer program could be very efficient in reaching the poor, but its 
amount could be too low to produce a significant increase in the living standards of the 
beneficiaries. We thus need another indicator, the Poverty Gap Efficiency (PGE), which 
shows how effective a cash benefit is in filling the poverty gap, A/(A+D). The measures 
compare the effectiveness of instruments in closing the pre-transfer poverty gap defined in 
terms of disposable equivalent income before transfers, and the poverty line is given by 60% 
of median post-transfer disposable equivalent income.  
 
Table 3 reports the target efficiency results for Brazil and for the Southern European 
countries. The Brazilian instruments can be divided into two groups, (i) the pension, 
unemployment benefit and wage/family benefit and (ii) the Bolsa-Escola and the old age 
benefit. In the first group, the poverty efficiency is very low. In fact only 15% of pension 
expenditure reduces poverty with the remaining proportion bringing people who would be 
below the poverty line (measured as 60% of median disposable income) above the poverty 
line or in the case of 60% of the instrument going to households above the poverty line even 
in the absence of the instrument. For the other two instruments in this group, 70% of the 
benefit goes to families above the poverty line pre-transfer. These instruments exhibit far less 
targeting than other means-tested benefits in the Southern European countries. The group (ii) 
instruments however exhibit a high degree of targeting, with PRE’s of nearly 90%, indicating 
that they are very efficient anti-poverty instruments. However because these instruments are 
relatively unimportant in terms of expenditure they reduce poverty by less than pensions 
despite their low targeting.  
 
It has often been argued, especially in Southern Europe, about the inability of the 
administrations to deliver targeted programs due to the “softness of state institutions” 
(Ferrera, 2001). What these results illustrate however is that the Government administration in 
Brazil is capable of delivering highly targeted policy instruments. Given the level of public 
expenditure in Brazil there is significant room within the Government budget constraint to 
redirect expenditures towards the very poor without the requirement of raising more 
resources. It is therefore a matter of political will rather than administrative capacity to 




This study offers additional evidence to the conclusion reached by Chu et al (2002) that the 
redistributive effects of tax-benefit systems in developing (and transition) countries are much 
less expressive than those observed in developed countries. In the case of Brazil, however, the 
problem cannot be associated to a low tax-to-GDP ratio, but to the fact that social spending 
bears little relation to need. This is particularly true of social security pensions, which are 
concentrated on the most well-off households. Although assistance programs like Bolsa- 
Escola are well focused on the most vulnerable population, the budget devoted to these 
programs is still a minuscule share of total social spending. 
  11. 
Many researchers and policy-makers in Brazil have argued that the tax side of the budget 
should play a more significant redistributive role. However, the predominance of indirect 
taxes and the way the progressivity of the personal income tax interacts with the highly 
unequal income distribution render the tax system a poor redistributive tool. Furthermore, 
experience has shown that the most affluent groups have managed to benefit most from tax 
breaks and allowances or indeed from any opportunity for tax reduction (or evasion) provided 
by the tax legislation in Brazil.  
 
In a society as unequal as the Brazilian one, political economy considerations should be 
central to any proposal intended to improve the way tax and benefits are distributed amongst 
its population. Our view is that the tax-benefit system should be as simple and transparent as 
possible, with the expenditure side of the budget as the fundamental redistributive instrument 
– primarily through the provision of basic services and well-targeted direct transfers to 
households. We think that the visibility and understanding of the tax and benefit system is a 
key condition to motivate and empower people to demand, through the democratic process, 
more effective redistributive policies.  
 
In this paper, in addition to the policy implications of this study we have also addressed a 
number of potential technical modelling developments that are desirable and as such create an 
agenda for future work: 
•  In order to aid future policy reform analysis, it would be desirable to extend the number of 
instruments simulated in the model to include as many benefit instruments as is 
technically possible. This would allow analysts to evaluate benefit design changes. 
•  Part of the revenue raised by some of the taxes included in the present study is used to 
finance government services that have an important effect on household living standard, 
such as health and education. However, this study has focused on the impact on current 
monetary incomes. A more comprehensive approach, simulating non-cash welfare 
services would result in a more significant impact of the Brazilian tax-benefit system on 
the welfare of the lower income groups. 
•  As the most important revenue source, indirect taxation is a large potential area for reform 
and analysis. However because our data source does not incorporate expenditure 
information, the analysis thus far has relied on relatively crude imputation methods. It is 
planned to improve our capacity for analysis of indirect taxation reform by statistically 
matching household expenditure information from other surveys into our base survey. 
•  Finally our analysis has avoided a detailed discussion about the importance of tax evasion, 
again relying on relatively crude methods for adjustment. One of our next pieces of work 
plans to relate survey analysis with data provided by the fiscal authorities to assess and 
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
Table 1 – Percentage shares of household income, ratios of share 
of the top 20% to share of bottom 20% and Gini coefficients 









Decile Group         
Bottom 0.7  0.8  1.0  0.9 
2
nd   1.5  1.7  1.9  1.8 
3
rd   2.3  2.5  2.7  2.5 
4
th   3.2  3.4  3.6  3.4 
5
th   4.2  4.5  4.6  4.4 
6
th   6.0  5.9  6.0  5.6 
7
th   8.2  8.1  8.1  7.7 
8
th   11.3  10.9  10.9  10.5 
9
th   16.7  16.5  16.5  16.5 
Top 45.9  45.7  44.8  46.6 
        
All households  100  100  100  100.0 
        
Ratio of share of 
top 20% to bottom 
20% 
29.2 24.4  21.4 22.8 
        
Gini coefficient  0.642  0.581  0.564  0.579 
              Notes:  
1. Households Ranked by Equivalent Income. All Incomes expressed per adult equivalent, where the equivalence scale 
used is 1 for the principle adult, 0.7 for other adults and  0.5 for children aged under 18. 
2. Initial Income - total annual income of all members of the household before the deduction of taxes or the addition of 
any state benefits. 
3. Gross Income – Initial Income plus State Benefits. 
4. Disposable Income – Gross Income minus direct taxes and contributions. 
5. Final Income – Disposable Income minus Indirect Taxes. 
  15.Table 2. Progressivity and Redistributive Effect of Brazilian Tax-Benefit 
Instruments 








  A B  C D 
Taxes       
       
Personal Income Tax  -0.037  0.251  0.008  0.001 
Social Contribution - Employee  -0.037  0.023  0.001  0.000 
Social Contribution - Employer  -0.097  0.044  0.003  0.002 
Direct Taxes  -0.171  0.084  0.013  0.004 
       
ICMS -0.083  -0.109  -0.010  0.000 
IPI -0.014  -0.150  -0.002  0.000 
COFINS -0.040  -0.087  -0.004  0.000 
PIS/PASEP -0.003  -0.366  -0.001  0.000 
Indirect Taxes  -0.140  -0.111  -0.018  0.000 
       
Total Taxes  -0.311  -0.004  -0.007  0.005 
       
Benefits       
Pension 0.212  -0.678  0.048  0.070 
Unemployed Benefit  0.007  -0.610  0.004  0.000 
Wage Bonus and Family Benefit  0.003  -0.491  0.001  0.000 
Old Age Benefit  0.004  -1.394  0.004  0.001 
Bolsa-Escola Programs  0.003  -1.189  0.004  0.000 
Total Benefits  0.228  -0.686  0.061  0.069 
Notes: 
1. All incomes have been equivalised using the scale described in table 1. 
2. The base income used is initial income. In other words the progressivity of an income is expressed relative to the 
progressivity of initial income. The rate refers to the instrument as a proportion of initial income and redistribution 
measures the change in the distribution of income through the inclusion of the instrument in question. 
  16.Table 3. Poverty Efficiency of Brazilian Benefits compared with Social 
Assistance Instruments in Southern European Countries 
 VEE  PRE  S  PGE 
Brazil        
Pension 39.7 15.4 61.3  33.5
Unemployed Benefit  30.6 26.6 13.0  4.4
Wage Bonus and Family Benefit  30.4 28.7 5.6  3.0
Old Age Benefit  94.0 88.1 6.2  2.7
Bolsa-Escola Programs  90.7 89.5 1.4  12.7
        
Social Assistance (Means-tested Child Benefits)         
France 45.5 36.5 19.8  41.9
Greece 26.2 24.3 7.2  4.4
Italy 63.4 56.3 11.2  19.9
Portugal 33.2 32.5 2.0  15
Spain 55.9 51.7 7.5  6.8
        
Social Assistance (Other Means-tested Benefits)         
France 60.0 43.2 28.0  72.5
Greece 55.3 47.2 14.6  23.9
Italy 51.9 39.3 24.4  14.4
Portugal 60.5 46.4 23.3  30.9
Spain 53.5 39.9 25.4  33,0
Source: Brazil - Authors’ Calculations; Other Countries – O’Donoghue et al. (2003)  
Notes: 
1. Poverty Headcount as a percentage of total population. 
2. Poverty Line in terms of Median Equivalised Disposable Income (Equivalence Scale, 1, 0.7, 0.5/Head, Other Adult/ Children 
Aged 17-). 
3. VEE - Vertical Expenditure Efficiency, PRE - Poverty Reduction Efficiency, S - Spillover Index, PGE - Poverty Gap 
Efficiency. 
  17.Figure 1 
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Structure of a Tax-Benefit System
               Source: Immervoll and O’Donoghue (2001) 
 
 
























































































































































                                                 
17 Source: Authors’ Calculations. Households ranked by equivalised final income decile as defined by the equivalence scale in table 1. 
Unequivalised Incomes in figures a-c defined as a percentage of household initial income. Incomes in figures d defined as absolute average 
annual equivalised instrument value. 
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Figure 4. The Reduction in the Gini Coefficient due to Direct Taxes and Benefits 
 
 
                            Source: Baldini, Mantovani and O’Donoghue (forthcoming); Beer et al (2001) 
                        
 
Figure 5. The Efficiency of Social Assistance 
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                                    Source: Beckerman (1979) 
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